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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 10068

CLOYD REED ALLRED,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant Cloyd Reed Allred has appealed from a
conviction of the crime of grand larceny, in violation of
Title 76, Chapter 38, Sections 1 and 4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, in the Third Judicial District Court.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was brought to trial on October 16, 1963 in
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, charged with the crimes of burglary in the
2nd degree and grand larceny. The appellant was found
guilty by the jury of both crimes charged. On October 17,
1963, subsequent to the time of the appellant's conviction
on the above referenced charges, the court on its own motion vacated and set aside the conviction of burglary in the
2nd degree ( R. 28) .
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent State of Utah submits that the appellant's
conviction for the crime of grand larceny should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent State of Utah submits the following
statement of facts as being more in keeping with the rule
that the evidence will be reviewed on appeal in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict.
On September 5, 1963, Pete Sayatovich, who resided
in Kim's Apartments in Copperton, Utah, heard a disturbance outside of his apartment (R. 51). He observed two
individuals, going up the side of a mountain adjacent to the
apartments, carrying something (R. 52). Mr. Sayatovich
examined the door to the entrance of Kim's Market, which
was immediately downstairs from where he lived (R. 51),
and noticed that the front door had been pried open and
the padlock broken ( R. 52) . Ruth Goff, the proprietress of
Kim's Market, indicated that when she closed the market
on the 4th of September at 8: 00 p.m., she had locked and
padlocked it and had closed and locked the backdoor to the
premises (R. 61). At approximately 3 o'clock in the morning on the 5th of September, she examined the store premises and found that the front door had been forced open
and the padlock was off the door. The backdoor was in the
same condition that she left it (R. 61). An examination of
the premises disclosed that 150 cartons of cigarettes, a .38
caliber pistol, a pair of coveralls, a radio, Kennecott safety
boots, a check protector and check book had been taken
from the premises ( R. 63 through 70).
At noon, on the 6th of September, 1963 (R. 95), Deputy Sheriff Paul LaBounty saw the accused in the vicinity of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3rd South and 7th East in Salt Lake City (R. 95). Officer
LaBounty had previously been given information from an
informant that the appellant had been involved in the burglary and larceny at Kim's Market (R. 46). Officer LaBounty went to locate the appellant and found him in Salt
Lake City. The appellant was operating an automobile on
7th East and Officer LaBounty made aU-tum and started
to follow him. When he was within a distance of approximately 100 yards, the appellant pulled his automobile in a
driveway, got out and ran from the automobile ( R. 96,
110). Officer LaBounty approached the automobile and
noticed boots and coveralls in the vehicle of the kind which
had been taken in the burglary ( R. 9 7, 36) . The items were
in plain sight on the front seat of the automobile (R. 37).
On the 6th of September, Officer LaBounty went to an
apartment at 230 South 7th East, where the appellant had
been staying. The apartment was occupied by Donald
Madsen, who accompanied the officer ( R. 44) . Mr. Madsen invited the officer to come with him and search the
apartment (R. 45). The appellant had moved from the
apartment on the 5th of September ( R. 48) . Subsequent
to that search, Officer LaBounty obtained a search warrant
to search the same premises and recovered the .38 caliber
pistol taken during the burglary.
Subsequently, the appellant turned himself in at the
county jail to deputy sheriffs. At that time, the appellant
indicated that he had purchased the boots and coveralls
from some one and that he did not know where the gun had
come from (R. 99) . The appellant stated that he could not
recall where he had purchased the coveralls and boots but
that he had obtained them from some store ( R. 100) .
At the time of trial, Robert L. Nelson testified that a
check (Prosecution Exhibit 4), payable to Frank Cardwell
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and issued by Kim's Supermarket for $106.96, was passed
at his store by the appellant (R. 107). The check (Exhibit
4) was identified by Mrs. Goff as having been one of the
blank checks taken with her check book and check protector during the burglary.
While the appellant was confined in pretrial confinement in the county jail, he sent a letter to a friend in which
he stated:
"Get everybody who was at the house that nite to testify that I
was home all nite that I got home about 12 or 1 AM and stayed
home until about 11 A.M. that morning because I had the flue
and had been sick from Tues. until Friday.
"Get a bill of sale for the coveralls size 34 with a blue lapel and a
pair of 8-D Bond work shoes with high tops with steel toes and
steel arch support."

Prior to trial, the appellant made a motion to suppress
the evidence relating to the coveralls, boots and gun on the
grounds that they were obtained during an illegal search
and seizure. The motion was denied ( R. 49) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF THE CRIME OF GRAND
LARCENY.

The evidence in the instant case overwhelmingly establishes the accused's guilt. The fact that the trial court dismissed the burglary conviction does not render the larceny
conviction void, but merely tends to show the trial court
was more lenient to the appellant than was warranted. 1
1
The appellant's statement that the trial court by its action somehow influenced the jury's verdict does not follow (Brief, p. 5). The jury had ~lready
returned its verdict and could not have in any way been concerned w1th the
court's action. The State submits that the trial court erred in dismissing the
burglary charge, since the same rule as to possession of recently stolen property that applies to larceny applies to burglary. State v. Thomas, 121 U. 639,
244 P.2d 653 ( 1952); State v. Manger, 7 U.2d 1, 315 P.2d 976 ( 1957); State
v. Nichols, 106 U. 104, 145 P.2d 802 (1944).
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76-38-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides:
"Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading
or driving away of the personal property of another. Possession
of property recently stolen~ when the person in possession fails to
makl' a satisfactory explanation~ shall be deemed prima facie
evidfnce of guilt."

Several Utah cases have held the evidence to be sufficient to convict an accused of larceny, based upon the presumption arising from the possession of recently stolen
property where the evidence was similar to that before the
trial court in this case. In State v. Crowder, 114 U. 202,
197 P.2d 917 (1948), this court upheld the accused's con\'iction of grand larceny, based upon evidence of possession
of recently stolen property. The accused was seen in the
vicinity of a house where $2,000 in cash in twenty dollar
bills was stolen. Before the theft, he had very little money.
Subsequently, he was seen to have $1,000 in twenty dollar
bills. This court, in upholding the conviction, stated:
"Appellant next contends that there was insufficient evidence
to sustain a conviction. His argument to sustain this contention
is that others also knew of Rottini's habits and the layout of his
home, and that on two prior occasions small sums had been missed,
and that on one such occasion his young son had taken it and on
the other occasion another boy was suspected. As to that evidence
it was a matter to be considered by the jury and not this court
what weight they wished to give it in arriving at a conclusion of
guilt or no guilt. Appellant also argues that there was no evidence
connecting him with the crime since the only evidence introduced
was that he was present in the vicinity of Rottini's home on one
of the nights on which the money could have been stolen and that
he was found in possession of $1000 in bills of the denomination
of twenty dollars and such evidence only shows a possibility that
the appellant took the money but is insufficient to show an actual
theft by him. We cannot agree with such a contention. The jury
could very reasonably find as it did from the evidence that appellant's presence in the immediate vicinity of Rottini's home and
his subsequent quick return to \Vyoming with a sum greatly in excess of any he was known to have had, and consisting of twenty
dollar bills which was the denomination of the stolen bills, and
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appellant's equivocal statements as to when he acquired these
b1lls, that appellant had stolen those bills as charged."

. In State v. Gillespie, 117 U. 114,213 P.2d 353 (1950),
th1s court affirmed a conviction for larceny similar to that
in this case although not as much evidence of guilt existed.
This court stated :
"* * * While the evidence may not be as complete as desired
it is sufficient to permit the trial judge to find beyond a reasonabl~
doubt that the appellant is guilty. Under our statute the essential
elements to be established by the state in prosecutions for larceny
need be only property_ recently stolen) possession by the defendant)
and an unsatisfactory explanation of the possession. These are all
established in the present instance. The evidence is sufficient both
to establish a prima facie case and to permit the court to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."

In this case the evidence clearly establishes the burglary
of Kim's Market on the 5th of September 1963. It further
clearly establishes that boots, coveralls and a gun were
taken from the store, and these and other items were taken
by two men. One day later, as Deputy Sheriff Paul LaBounty was working on the case, he sought to discuss the
matter with the appellant. He saw the appellant in his
automobile on 7th East in Salt Lake City and proceeded
to make aU-turn to approach the appellant concerning the
matter. As the appellant observed the officer, he pulled
his car into a driveway and ran away. This evidence of
flight is certainly inconsistent with innocence. Wigmore,
Evidence,§ 276, 3rd Ed., notes:
"Flight from justice, and its analogous conduct, have always
been deemed indicative of a consciousness of guilt."

The appellant himself admitted he ran and gave no reasonable explanation. Further, the possession of the property in
the appellant's car, which was stolen from Kim's Market,
was conscious recent possession. The same may be said of
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the .t.!:llll recovered from the appellant's former apartment.
Further, the appellant's explanation of how he came to acquire the property is contradictory and inconsistent. He
told Officer LaBounty that he bought the boots and coveralls from someone, and then that he bought them at a store
which he didn't recall. Another explanation was that he
received them from "a couple of guys I know." This explanation is refuted by Exhibit 5 in which the appellant tried
to get his friend, while appellant was in jail, to establish an
alibi and get evidence pertaining to his buying the stolen
articles. The evidence amply sustains the conviction.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

The appellant's position that the coveralls, boots, and
gun were obtained pursuant to an illegal search and seizure
is untenable. The evidence clearly supports the conclusion
that the above items were not obtained in violation of constitutional principles against unreasonable searches and
setzures.
Deputy Sheriff LaBounty had received reliable evidence
from an informant, that he knew to be dependable, that the
appellant was involved in the burglary of Kim's Market. 2
As a consequence, he desired to talk to the appellant concerning his possible involvement. Officer LaBounty drove
towards the area where the appellant lived and observed
the appellant in a vehicle on 7th East Street in Salt Lake
City. lTpon observing the appellant, LaBounty made a
V-tum and turned on his red lighe in order to stop the ap3
Such information in and of itself may be a basis for apprehension and
search or a search warrant. Rugendorf v. United States, 11 L.Ed.2d 837
( 196-J.).
s Appellant testified that he observed LaBounty and ran, and did not observe a light on the officer's car.
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pellant and talk to him. He did not desire to apprehend or
arrest the appellant. As he started to follow appellant and
was some 100 yards away, the appellant drove his car into
a driveway, got out and ran. Officer LaBounty approached
the car, observed the stolen contraband on the front seat of
the car. Officer LaBounty testified that he seized these
items because he felt that if he left to get a warrant, the
appellant might return and remove the vehicle. Cf. Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 ( 1925). There is no legal
basis to contend that the seizure of these items was improper. First, it is submitted that the officer did not arrest
the appellant nor operate to arrest him. There is nothing
wrong with an officer stopping a person to talk with him
concerning his possible involvement in a crime. Leagre,
The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 Journal
of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 393, 417
( 1963); United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2nd Cir.
1960). This does not constitute apprehension under Utah
law and is a permissible use of the police power. In Gilliam
v. United States, 189 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1951), it was
stated:
"The stopping of appellant's car was not an arrest. No intent
to apprehend appellant was shown and no move was made to take
him into custody at that time. The officers did not open the car
door when it was stopped, nor state that appellant was under arrest, nor touch his person."

See also Vaccaro v. United States, 296 F.2d 500 (5th Cir.
1961), cert. den. 369 U.S. 890. Davis, Federal Searches
and Seizures ( 1964). Remington, The Law Relating to
"On Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Privileges in General, 51 Journal
of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 388
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( 1960). In United States v. Bonanno, 180 F.Supp. 71 (DC
N.Y. 1960), the court noted:
"It is dear that the mere stopping of a car by a police officer
is not such an illegal act that would taint all evidence stemming
therefrom."

State v. Beckendorf, 70 U. 360, 10 P.2d 1073 ( 1932) ; Wendelboe v. jacobson, 10 U.2d 344, 353 P.2d 118 ( 1960).
In the instant case, the appellant's vehicle was not stopped, the appellant himself abandoned the vehicle; as a consequence, no act of the officer can be said to affect the
search in this instance.

In Davis, supra, at page 19, it is stated:
"The courts have ruled that abandoned property, open fields
and woods do not fall within the protection of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Under these rulings, officers are not
required to have a warrant or other legal justification in order to
search or seize such property."

In the instant case, the appellant fled, leaving his property in the presence of the officer. The car was parked in a
driveway. The officer had every right to examine the abandoned property and seize the contraband. Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Haerr v. United States, 240
F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 195 7) . The officer acted properly when
he seized the property and appellant may not complain.
Additionally, and most obviously, the contraband was
in "plain sight" on the front seat of the appellant's abandoned car. The officer had a right, as well as a duty, to
seize the contraband. In Davis, supra,§ 9.11, at page 349,
it is noted:
"Assuming there is no unauthorized invasion of private property, the mere observation or visual inspection of what is open and
patent does not constitute a search. This is true whether the observations are made with the aid of natural or artificial light."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1957),
it is stated:
. "A s~arch implie.s an examination of one's premises or person
with a v~ew to the ~Iscovery ~f c:ontraband or evidence of guilt to
be used m. pros~cut~on of a cnmmal action. The term implies exploratory mvest1gat10n or quest. 79 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures
Sec. 1. Stopping the aut?mobile in quest of aliens was the duty of
the Border Patrol, and It was a part of the performance of this
duty to look into the automobile. Mere observation, however
does not constitute a search. United States v. Lee, 1926, 274 U.S~
559, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202; Ellison v. United States, D.C.
Cir., 1953, 206 F.2d 476; United States v. Strickland, D.C.S.C.,
1945, 62 F.Supp. 468."

In The Federal Law on Search and Seizure, F. B. I. ( 1962),
it is stated:
"It is not a search for the officer to merely see what is open and
visible to the eye in or on the vehicle either by daylight or by artificial light. U. S. v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 ( 1927). 'Police officers in
dealing with investigation of crime are not required to blindfold
themselves.' U. S. v. O'Brien, 174 F2d 341 (1949); Smith v.
U. S., 2 F2d 715 ( 1924); Petteway v. U. S., 261 F2d 63 ( 1958).
It is not a search for the officer to shine his flashlight into the
vehicle at night. Smith v. U. S., supra; U. S. v. Strickland, 62
F.Supp. 468 (1945); Haerr v. U.S., 240 F2d 533 (1957); U.S.
v. O'Brien, 174 F2d 341 (1949) (open end of a truck). The
officer has a right to shine his light into the vehicle at night 'for his
own protection, if for no other reason.' Bell v. U.S. 254 F2d 82
( 1958), cert. den. 358 U.S. 885. In a patrol boat, he may use the
searchlight. U. S. v. Lee, supra. The information which the
officer obtains by looking into the vehicle or any part of it which
he may see without any action of opening a door or other part has
been lawfully obtained without a search."

It becomes obvious, therefore, that the officer in the instant case acted within the law in obtaining the boots and
coveralls from the appellant's vehicle.
With reference to the search of the apartment, where
appellant lived, it appears that the search on September 6,
1963 was at the permission and invitation of the then occupant. The accused had moved out on September 5, 1963
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and Officer LaBounty examined the premises upon the consent of the then occupant. Consequently, the first search
was based on consent. People v. Torres, 158 Cal.App.2d
21J. 322 P.2d 300 ( 1958). Even so, nothing appears to
have been discovered and obtained during that search. Subsequently, the search was made pursuant to a search warrant and the pistol obtained. Consequently, that item was
not illegally obtained. McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S.
95 (1927); United States v. Kaplan, 286 F. 963 (1923).
Davis, supra, § 2.0.
The appellant's contention that he was denied his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment is without any merit.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE

JURY.

The appellant has challenged the court's giving of various instructions to the jury. The appellant challenges Instruction No. 7 given by the court (R. 123), contending
that this is an inappropriate instruction. The facts of the
instant case clearly show that as Deputy Sheriff LaBounty
approached the appellant the day after the commission of
the burglary at Kim's Market, the appellant stopped his car
and ran from the officer. The instruction given by the court
is generally in accordance with Instruction No. 36, California Jury Instructions, Criminal, based upon the California Penal Code, Section 1127 (c). As previously noted,
flight is evidence from which an inference of guilt may be
dra\\n. \Vigmore, Evidence, § 276, infra page 6. In the
instant case the jury was instructed that flight in and of itself was not sufficient to prove guilt but was merely a circumstance \\·hich they could consider. The fact that the appellant subsequently turned himself in does not necessarily
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diminish the inference that could have been properly
drawn from appellant's flight. In People v. Jordan, 290
P.2d 484 (Cal. 1955), the California Supreme Court upheld the same instruction as was given in this case. Since
the evidence amply justified an inference of guilt from appellant's flight and the instruction was not otherwise improper, no error can be claimed.
The appellant further contends that the trial court erred
in giving Instruction No.8 (a) ( R. 126, 127). The instruction given was appropriate to the admission into evidence
and the circumstances surrounding Exhibit 4, which was a
check taken from Kim's Market on the morning of September 5, 1963. The evidence showed that the check had in
fact been taken from the market and that subsequently the
appellant passed the check to a grocer. The check was returned, indicating that the payee's signature was not an
authorized signature. The court clearly instructed the jury
that the accused was not charged with any check offense
and indicated that Exhibit 4 could only be considered for
what evidentiary weight it might have on the burglary and
grand larceny charges. The appellant contends that the
court erred in indicating in the instruction that Exhibit 4
might show the commission of another offense. Exhibit 4
and the circumstances surrounding accused's possession of
it, in fact, did show such actions on the part of the appellant
from which it might be inferred that another offense had
been committed. 76-26-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
makes it a criminal offense to forge a negotiable instrument,
and 76-26-6 makes it a crime to pass any such instrument.
76-26-7 makes it a crime to issue any fraudulent paper and
makes it criminal conduct to pass a fictitious check. These
are all offenses which the facts and circumstances surrounding this case might lead a reasonable person to believe the
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accused had committed. The court, therefore, properly
advised the jury that this evidence could be considered by
them to the extent that it related to the burglary and,
further, properly advised the jury that the accused was not
in fact charged with a check offense. Thus, an appropriate
cautionary instruction, preliminary to the substantive instruction, was given and it cannot be said that the instruction was in any way prejudicial. The facts and circumstances concerning other crimes are relevant"To complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its
immediate context of happenings near in time and place."

1\lcC ormick on Evidence at page 328 ( 1954).

The appellant objects to the court having given Instruction No. 3, claiming that the instruction failed to state the
appellant's theory of the case (R. 121). Instruction No. 3
is merely a statement of the elements of the crime of larceny
and burglary. This instruction was exactly what this court
in People v. Flynn, 7 U. 378, 26 Pac. 1114 ( 1891), said the
trial court should give. The fact that some other instruction
would have better suited the appellant's case is immaterial.
If appellant had desired an instruction on a particular issue,
it was up to the appellant to make a request. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., § 661. Obviously, no error exists on this point.
The appellant contends that it was error to give Instruction No. 6 (R. 123). This instruction merely informed the
jury that grand larceny requires that they find the value of
the property taken to be in excess of fifty dollars and indicated that they could add the value of the various items
taken in making a determination. This is an appropriate
statement of the law. The jury had before it evidence of a
number of items having been taken from Kim's Market.
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They also had the value placed upon the items by the proprietress and other evidence upon which value could be
established. This, therefore, raised a jury question and the
jury was properly advised on the issue. It is, of course, appropriate to join the value of all items taken where the larceny of many items was in fact one larceny.
None of the instructions to which the appellant objects
were in any way improper and in no way can be determined
to be prejudicial. 77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, expressly requires that before a case can be reversed, it must
appear that the error was of such a grave nature as to affect
the substantial rights of a party. Prejudicial error is not
presumed. This rule is equally applicable to instructions in
criminal cases. State v. HallJ 105 U. 162, 145 P.2d 494
( 1943).
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the evidence in the instant case makes it
manifest that the accused's guilt was proved beyond any
reasonable doubt by overwhelming evidence. The legal
errors assigned for reversal are without merit. The trial of
the accused did not deprive him of any substantial right
which would warrant this court in reversing. The court
should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

